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Barristers behaving badly: free speech and 
protection from harassment 
 
Hewson v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2018] EWHC 471 (Admin) 
 
Introduction 
 
Most legal conflicts between freedom of expression and the right to private life are 
determined within the law of misuse of private information,1or, if the speech is 
claimed to be untrue, the law of defamation.2  In these cases, the courts have to 
balance the rights of free speech and the public right to know with the privacy rights 
of the other party and must ensure that those rights are not interfered with 
disproportionately.3 Further, in those cases, a public interest defence will be available 
to ensure that freedom of expression and the public right to know is not interfered 
with unreasonably.4  
 
However, other legal remedies exist for those who feel that their privacy or other 
interests have been affected by the speech or actions of others; and in a number of 
cases claimants have used the law of harassment, contained in the Protection from 
                                                 
1 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] AC 457 
2  See now the Defamation Act 2013, which augments the common law of defamation. 
3 See S (A Child) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication), Re [2004] UKHL 47, which insists that 
neither free speech nor privacy be given any predominance when in conflict; the dispute being settled 
by applying proportionality. 
4 The defence of public interest has always been available in the law of confidentiality and misuse of 
private information and a specific public interest defence is now contained in s.4 of the Defamation Act 
2013. 
Harassment Act 1997, to control what is alleged to be abusive or other harmful 
actions and speech.5 The Act does have a reasonableness defence, in s.1(3), so the 
courts are able to take into account free speech norms and balance free speech with 
the other interests of the claimant, and this defence has been employed on a number of 
occasions, sometimes with success.6  
 
The Act was employed successfully in a recent decision of the High Court,7 which 
dealt with rather unusual facts – a claim made by one barrister that another barrister 
had been tweeting offensive messages to her following a lengthy exchange of views 
and insults exchanged between the two. This case note will examine the case with a 
view to discovering whether the tenets of free speech are fully applicable to cases 
involving harassment, and whether free speech is given sufficient protection when it 
conflicts with the right of the claimant not to be subject to harassment. As we shall 
see, the free speech arguments might be a good deal weaker once the threshold for 
harassment has been satisfied, making it unlikely, in most case, that the free speech 
will trump the victim’s interests. 
 
The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 
 
For the purposes of the examination of Hewson, s.1 of the Act provides as follows: 
                                                 
5 Such actions are particularly popular in controlling the tactics of demonstrators when they attack 
commercial companies and their employees.  This aspect and the cases are dealt with later on in the 
case note. 
6 See the cases detailed in the analysis section of this piece, below. 
7 Hewson v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2018] EWHC 471 (Admin) 
 
 (1) A person must not pursue a course of conduct— 
 
(a) which amounts to harassment of another, and 
(b) which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other. 
 
(2) For the purposes of this section the person whose course of conduct is in question 
ought to know that it amounts to [or involves] harassment of another if a reasonable 
person in possession of the same information would think the course of conduct 
amounted to [or involved] harassment of the other.  
 
(3) Subsection (1) does not apply to a course of conduct if the person who pursued it 
shows—  
 
(c) that in the particular circumstances the pursuit of the course of conduct was 
reasonable. 
 
The facts and decision in Hewson 
 
In this case a practising barrister sought judicial review of a police decision to issue 
her with a prevention of harassment letter (PHL) under the Prevention of Harassment 
Act 1997. For some months, the barrister, who was also a legal writer who 
contributed articles in the legal and non-legal media, had been involved in an online 
dispute with another practising barrister, the complainant. Initially, the exchanges 
were concerned with the barristers’ differing views on child abuse cases, but between 
autumn 2016 and February 2017, the barrister posted a number of what the 
complainant regarded as abusive "tweets" on the social media site "Twitter", and 
posted online messages and sent emails to the complainant's chambers and associates 
which the complainant regarded as abusive.8 Her conduct continued despite the 
complainant sending letters before action and complaining to the police and the Bar 
Standards Board.9 On 23 February 2017, a police officer telephoned the barrister to 
arrange for her to be interviewed under caution. However, the call was cut off before 
an interview could be arranged. Thereafter, the barrister posted further tweets 
referring to the complainant,10 and the police decided to issue a PHL without 
interviewing her.   
 
The barrister did not dispute that she had posted tweets that were expressed in strong 
language and were extremely pejorative of the complainant. However, she contended 
that she had done so in the context of a campaign of harassment by the complainant, 
and that her tweets were simply "tit for tat." Thus, she claimed that her tweets had to 
be seen in the context of her allegation that she was being the subject of cyber-
stalking by the complainant, and that the complainant was complaining to the police 
and other authorities to deflect any criticism of her behaviour.  The barrister also 
argued that issuing the PHL violated her rights of private life (under article 8 ECHR 
                                                 
8 The tweets included one accusing the complainant of being a "malicious crackpot" and "unhinged". 
9 Many of these tweets referred to the claimant’s allegation that the complainant was launching a 
cyber-attack on her, through anonymous tweeters, which later formed the basis of the claimant’s case, 
below. 
10 These tweets, amongst other things, called the complainant "evil" and "dodgy", and suggested that 
the complainant had made a "malevolent intrusion into my private life acting in concert with #Trolls 
#Evil". 
and freedom of expression under article 10 ECHR). She also claimed that the process 
followed by the police lacked effective procedural safeguards and breached her 
legitimate expectation that, before issue, she would be interviewed under caution and 
given the opportunity to tell her side of the story. 
 
In the High Court, Dove J refused the application. Dealing firstly with the complaint 
under article 8 ECHR, the judge recognised that the issuing of a PHL was neither 
authorised nor governed by statute, and stemmed from the wide discretion afforded to 
the police in carrying out their duty of enforcing the law.11 Further, it was accepted 
that the court would interfere with the exercise of that discretion only in extreme 
cases.12 The judge stated that while the issue of a PHL was justified by reference to 
the ingredients of the offence of harassment set out in s.1 of the 1997 Act, it 
nevertheless constituted an interference with the recipient's rights under article 8(1) 
ECHR.13 Accordingly, the proportionality of that interference in any given case would 
depend on the circumstances and an assessment of the nature of the PHL and the 
process leading to its issue.14  
The judge noted that there was a public dimension to the case in that views published 
on social media were in the public domain, and there had been coverage of the dispute 
                                                 
11 Hewson v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2018] EWHC 471 (Admin), at paragraph 23, 
following R. v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis Ex p. Blackburn (Albert Raymond) (Order of 
Mandamus) [1973] QB 241 
12 Ibid. 
13 Hewson v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2018] EWHC 471 (Admin), at paragraphs 23-
25 
14 Hewson v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2018] EWHC 471 (Admin), at paragraphs 33-
35 
between the claimant and the complainant in the national media. Further, while it was 
important to bear in mind the implications for the barrister's reputation, that factor 
was considerably tempered by the fact that a PHL was merely a warning, did not 
involve any formal determination, and carried no imputation that the conduct alleged 
had actually taken place. It was, therefore, not a determination that the offence of 
harassment had been committed.15  
 
In terms of procedural fairness, the judge noted that it might be good practice to speak 
to potential recipients before issuing such orders, although fairness did not require 
that that should happen in every case; and it did not require that the claimant should 
have been interviewed in the instant case. By mid-February 2017, the claimant was 
aware that the police were investigating an allegation made against her by the 
complainant, and when she was contacted by the officer on 23 February she clearly 
drew the inference that his enquiry was a consequence of that complaint. Given that 
her social media communications continued in the same vein, the decision to issue the 
PHL without further investigation was understandable. In the circumstances, 
therefore, the interference with the claimant’s article 8 rights was proportionate and 
pursued the legitimate aim of drawing her attention to the fact that her social media 
communications were said to be causing the complainant distress and alarm.16  
                                                 
15 Hewson v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2018] EWHC 471 (Admin), at paragraphs 36-
37, and citing R. (on the application of Catt) v Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales 
and Northern Ireland [2013] EWCA Civ 192                 
16 Hewson v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2018] EWHC 471 (Admin), at paragraphs 34-
35.  His Lordship then went on to conclude that even if she had been interviewed, it was difficult to 
accept that she could have affected the officer's judgment. The PHL was simply notifying the barrister 
 The judge dealt with the article 10 issue without too much debate. Recognising that 
the discussion on article 8 fed into the claim under article 10, the judge stressed that it 
was important to remember that article 10 was a qualified right, capable of being 
restricted in the interests of the prevention of disorder or crime. Although the PHL 
interfered with the barrister's article 10 rights, that interference was proportionate, and 
the principles of common law fairness did not lead to any different conclusion.17  
 
Analysis 
 
As stated above, the High Court dedicated little time to assessing the value of the 
claimant’s free speech or balancing it with the complainant’s interests in private life. 
Given that the court accepted the complainant’s story regarding the dispute between 
the two barristers this is hardly surprising, as the claimant’s speech, once the initial 
exchanges were made,  could be said to have little if any merit in free speech terms. 
Yet, there are other obstacles to protecting free speech in actions brought under this 
legislation. 
 
One difficulty facing free speech in cases such as the present is convincing the court 
that such speech, couched in a crude and potentially abusive manner, is indeed speech 
                                                                                                                                            
of the allegations, and her providing her side of the story would not necessarily have obviated the 
justification for its issue (at paragraph 40) 
17 Hewson v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2018] EWHC 471 (Admin), at paragraphs 38-
40.  His Lordship further held that the police had not promised that the barrister would be interviewed 
before issue, and it was not procedurally unfair and disproportionate for there to have been no 
interview (at paragraphs 42-44). 
worthy of protection. In this respect both the domestic and European courts have 
established that generally article 10 covers every view, however objectionable or 
offensive.18 For example, in Livingstone v Adjudication Panel for England19 it was 
accepted that when Ken Livingstone (the then London Mayor) had accused a Jewish 
reporter of being a concentration camp guard, there had been an interference with his 
free speech which could not be justiﬁed unless he had acted unlawfully or there were 
otherwise satisfactory reasons to sanction him.20  In contrast, in Gaunt v OFCOM,21 
where a radio presenter had referred to a guest as a ‘Nazi’ and an ‘ignorant pig.’ It 
was held that although the presenter would be protected when he used offensive 
expression when interviewing a public official, such protection did not apply to 
gratuitous offensive insult or abuse or to repeated abusive shouting that served to 
express no real content. The decision in Gaunt stresses that it is not the words 
themselves which lost protection, but the lack of context in which they were used. In 
other words, speech should make some contribution to a debate or idea, as opposed to 
mindless and unfocused words.22 In Hewson, therefore, although the claimant was 
initially involved in a genuine debate on a matter of public interest, her subsequent 
                                                 
18 Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737. 
19 The Times, 9 November 2006; on the facts, it was held that the legislation, s.52 of the Local 
Government Act 2000, did not apply to conduct by public ﬁgures in their private lives. 
20 The court found that the comment had been made by Livingstone as an individual rather than as a 
public officer and it was unlikely that the public would think that he had brought his office into 
disrepute because of that comment. 
21 [2010] EWHC 1756 (Admin). 
22 Although it could be argued that Livingstone’s remark made no contribution to any debate, it should 
be stressed that the question in that case was whether he had brought the office into disrepute when 
making that statement in his private capacity. 
messages could be described as mere vulgar abuse, attracting little protection from the 
courts. 23 
 
Although the courts often have to balance a person’s privacy against another’s right to 
free speech, the domestic courts have vigorously protected individuals from what they 
regard as unreasonable harassment; this being the essential purpose of the 1997 Act. 
Thus the courts will ensure that the victim is not subjected to undue distress, even 
where the purpose of the communication was to engage in political or other debate 
and to raise matters of public interest. This obviously impacts on the extent of free 
speech claims, and the availability of any reasonableness defence under s.3, for if the 
threshold of harassment is met (by the occasioning of undue distress), then it may be 
difficult for the free speech argument to override the privacy interests of the victim. 
Accordingly, once a person’s tactics have caused the relevant amount of distress, 
despite the fact that those tactics were initially employed to pursue a genuine free 
speech purpose, it will be difficult for the courts to dismiss the harassment claim and 
to truly balance free speech with the right not to be harassed. For example, in Howlett 
v Holding,24 it was accepted that an order under the 1997 Act could be made even 
where the defendant was exercising his right of freedom of expression, and the subject 
of that free speech was a matter of genuine public debate. In Howlett, the defendant 
                                                 
23 Thus, in Sanders v Kingston [2005] EWHC 1145, it was held that a local councillor who made 
uninformed comments about deaths in Northern Ireland, calling on the people of Northern Ireland to 
apologise for killing soldiers and to hang their heads in shame for involving the English in their own 
quarrel, did not attract the special protection afforded to political speech because it was not an 
expression of his political opinion but merely his personal opinion. It was nevertheless recognised as 
speech under article 10 so as to protect him from disproportionate penalties. 
24 The Times, 8 February 2006. 
had pursued a campaign against the claimant - a local councilor - after she had spoken 
out against the defendant in a planning application. The campaign involved ﬂying 
abusive and derogatory banners and dropping leaﬂets from his aircraft, and placing 
her under surveillance in order to see whether she was committing beneﬁt fraud. The 
court held that the anguish suffered by the claimant was out of all proportion to the 
value attached to his right of free speech and was thus a necessary restriction under 
Article 10(2).25 
 
This approach makes it difficult to attach appropriate weight to free speech 
arguments, as the tactics employed by that person leads the court to concentrate on the 
protection of the victim. This is supported by the decision in Thomas v Newsgroup 
Newspapers,26 where it was held that it was not the conduct that made up an offence 
of harassment, but rather the effect of that conduct. Further, with respect to the 
motives of the action, it was for the defendants to show that the motive for their 
actions were reasonable, reasonableness being dependent in each case upon the 
particular circumstances. This suggests that in harassment cases (as opposed to 
privacy cases where in the balancing process both claims start on an equal footing, 
even where the claimant has been found to enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy) 
the defendant in a harassment claim will find it more difficult to justify their actions 
on free speech grounds.27  
                                                 
25 See also R v Debnath [2005] EWCA Crim 3472, where it was held that a restraining order 
prohibiting the defendant from publishing any information about the complainant or his ﬁancée, 
irrespective of whether it was true or false, was not in breach of article 10. 
26 [2002] EMLR 4. 
27 In Thomas, a newspaper had published an article explaining how police ofﬁcers had been disciplined 
after making racist comments about an asylum seeker. The claimant received a good deal of hate mail, 
 One instructive case that the court in Hewson did mention, albeit in passing, is the 
decision in Ware v McAllister,28 involving an ongoing dispute between a journalist 
and a property developer. In this case the claimant applied for a final injunction under 
the 1997 Act restraining the defendant journalist from harassing him. In 2002, the 
claimant had been involved in the development of a site and had been responsible for 
the site's safety. The defendant had investigated the site and taken photographs 
showing that it was dangerous and wrote a series of online articles about its condition, 
outlining the dangers that it posed to the public. As a result, the local authority 
became involved and the site was cleared up. It was accepted that from then onwards, 
neither that site, nor any others owned by the claimant, posed a danger to the public. 
In 2004 the claimant asked the defendant to take the articles down; which he refused 
to do and in 2011 the claimant instructed lawyers. Consequently the defendant 
updated his articles and began making criticisms of the claimant to various public 
authorities and clubs which the claimant was associated with. The defendant was 
convicted of harassment and was prohibited from publishing anything about the 
claimant, although he continued to do so in any event. On appeal, that prohibition was 
lifted, but the defendant reacted by increasing his campaign and began to distribute 
flyers showing unflattering pictures of the claimant.  The defendant submitted that the 
articles were true and in the public interest. He further submitted that it was 
                                                                                                                                            
which, she claimed, had caused her considerable distress. Refusing to strike the action out, the Court of 
Appeal held that the publication of press articles calculated to incite racial hatred of an individual was a 
course of conduct capable of amounting to harassment under the 1997 Act. In the court’s view, the 
reference in the articles to the claimant’s colour was not reasonable and it was foreseeable that Sun 
readers would send hate mail after the article was published.  
28 (2015) QBD, 24 July/2015 
fundamental under article 10 ECHR that he should not be bullied into silence by a 
more powerful person. 
 
After establishing that the continued conduct of the defendant clearly constituted 
harassment, the court then considered the article 10 rights of the defendant and 
whether his conduct was reasonable under s.1(3) of the Act. In the Court’s view, 
where the words were journalistic, then the question of whether the conduct was 
reasonable concerned the balance between the claimant's article 8 and the defendant's 
article 10 rights: the justifications for interfering with each right had to be taken into 
account and the proportionality test had to be applied to each. The claimant's case was 
strong: for 13 years he had been subjected to grave public criticisms in strong and 
vilifying terms. It had grown more severe over the years as every attempt to restrain it 
had been treated as a further provocation justifying further criticism. Even a criminal 
court's restraining order had been ignored, and once it was lifted, the campaign had 
gathered renewed force. It was, in the Court’s view, akin to stalking and the claimant 
had been caused severe anxiety and distress and his article.8 rights were very 
substantially engaged.  
 
As for the defendant's article 10 rights, the original articles had been legitimate 
exercises in public interest journalism. However, by 2015, it was hard to see that there 
was any public interest or any other legitimate reasons for the campaign. The fact that 
at least some of the allegations were true was a significant point in the defendant's 
favour, but it was not a trump card. Since 2002, the site had remained safe and past 
public interest had evaporated almost completely. There was no continuing future 
public interest in publication that was sufficient to outweigh the claimant's article 8 
rights. The court stressed that article 10 was a qualified right and those who wanted to 
exercise their article 10 rights had a countervailing responsibility to show that if the 
words were injurious to others there was sufficient justification for them.  On the facts 
there was little justification for permitting the defendant to exercise his article 10 
rights in a manner plainly injurious to the claimant. As to proportionality, what had 
started as a legitimate exercise in public interest journalism had become almost a 
personal vendetta, based on a desire to reinforce the defendant's own sense of 
personal worth. It was not a conflict between public interest journalism and private 
interest, but purported public interest journalism against substantive article 8 rights 
and the balance clearly lay in favour of granting relief.  
 
The decision in Ware indicates that greater strength will be given to the free speech 
arguments if they are journalistic in nature, and where the purpose of the speech 
remains journalistic and a matter of public debate. This is reflected in s.12(4) of the 
Human Rights Act 1998,29 and the court in Ware was clearly influenced by the fact 
that the defendant was, at least initially, pursuing a journalistic goal. Although many 
would argue that the defendant’s speech remained journalistic, the court felt that the 
public interest nature of the stories had diminished with the defendant’s unnecessary 
and private vendetta.  
 
In Ware, the journalist had, thus, exhausted his professional immunity and the public 
interest in the story, and thus lost the battle between free speech and the interests of 
                                                 
29 Section 12(4) provides that where the speech in question is of a (journalistic) nature the court must 
have regard, inter alia, to the extent to which it is, or would be, in the public interest for the material to 
be published. 
the claimant. Nevertheless, until that time the court displayed a greater deal of 
tolerance than would be expected in cases not involving the press. This preference 
was also evident in the case of Trimingham v Associated Newspapers,30 where the 
court offered a high level of editorial judgement when a newspaper had written 
several articles about the claimant’s affair with an MP, often referring to her sexuality 
and making comments about her masculine appearance. In the court’s view, 
discussion or criticism of sexual relations which arose within a pre-existing 
professional relationship which involved the deception of a spouse, or civil partner or 
others with a right not to be deceived, were matters which a reasonable person would 
not think was conduct amounting to harassment and would think was reasonable.31 
Whilst she suffered distress about insulting and offensive words used about her and 
her appearance, it could not be accepted that the defendant ought to have known that 
its conduct in relation to that language would be sufficiently distressing to be 
considered as oppressive or amount to harassment.  
 
The Trimingham case can of course be explained on the basis that it involved the 
private lives of ‘true’ public figures, and that the details related to matters of true 
public interest – that the affair cast doubt on the fitness of both persons to hold public 
office and to carry out their respective functions responsibly. Nevertheless, the case 
clearly provides the press with a wide area of editorial discretion in how these matters 
are reported and what language is employed in relaying the story to the public; and 
                                                 
30  [2012] EWHC 1269 (QB) 
31 The public therefore had an interest in knowing whether they could trust them both not to deceive 
them and had an interest in knowing how the personal life of a leading politician was likely to affect 
the business of government 
this was enough to defeat not only the privacy claim but the action under the 1997 
Act.  That editorial judgment and press freedom are not unlimited is clearly seen in 
the Ware judgment, and once the journalist lost sight of his duties as a journalist the 
defence under s.1(3) of the Act was also lost. 
 
The principles of journalistic freedom are not restricted to the press in cases under the 
1997 Act and in Merlin Entertainments LPC v Cave32 the court refused to grant an 
interim injunction restraining a defendant from sending mass emails and setting up 
websites on which he campaigned on the issue of safety in theme parks and criticised 
the companies involved in running the parks. In this case after an accident at one of 
the claimant’s parks where a child was seriously injured, the defendant and his 
company were retained to provide a confidential report. There was a dispute regarding 
payment for the report and subsequently the defendant sent a series of emails 
criticising the claimant’s company and its employees. He also engaged in mail drops 
to local residents and businesses. In the proceedings the defendant argued that the 
case raised an important issue about the lawfulness of campaigns which, if their 
content was correct, were in the public interest. 
 
In the court’s view,  the course of conduct relied on did not amount to harassment and 
the claimants had not satisfied the court that their substantive claim was more likely 
than not to succeed at trial. The real question for the court was whether the conduct 
complained of had extra elements of oppression, persistence and unpleasantness.33 
                                                 
32 [2018] EWCA Civ 612 
33  See also Mainwaring v Associated Newspapers, unreported (2017) QBD), 2 July 2017, where part of 
a harassment claim was struck out insofar as it concerned contact between newspaper reporters and the 
The court also had to ensure that any relief sought, while restraining objectionable 
conduct went no further than was absolutely necessary in interfering with the 
defendant’s article 10 rights. In this case, there was no evidence of any threatening or 
abusive communications; rather, they contained, at times, strong criticism, which was 
quite a different thing. In the court’s view there was no basis for a blanket prohibition 
on any communication with or about the companies' officers, employees or agents. 
An order in those terms would interfere with the defendant’s article 10 rights. The 
conduct of the defendant might be annoying or irritating, but it was not conduct grave 
enough to be a crime.34 
 
However, the success of freedom of expression witnessed in the press freedom and 
related cases, above, has not been as evident in cases where the Act has been used 
against protestors. Originally it was thought that the legislation was not appropriate in 
cases where the defendant was exercising his or her right to demonstrate. Thus, in 
Huntington Life Sciences v Curtin35 it was held that the Act was clearly not intended 
                                                                                                                                            
claimant, who had painted her property with large red and whites stripes in the course of a planning 
dispute. The reporters' conduct (of following up on the story) had been well within the range of options 
open to responsible journalists following up a story, and it was relevant that the painting had been a 
public gesture likely to attract attention. 
 
34 See also the Northern Ireland case of Fulton v Sunday Newspapers [2017] NICA 45, where a 
newspaper had established that its approach to publishing articles about the appellant was reasonable in 
the circumstances. In the court’s view, there was a public interest in exposing alleged paramilitary 
influence in a loyalist area of Belfast which the investigations conducted by the newspaper had 
uncovered. 
35 The Times, 11 December 1999.  
by parliament to be used to clamp down on the discussion of matters of public interest 
or upon the rights of political protest and public demonstration which were so much 
part of our democratic society. However, where there is evidence that protestors have 
taken part in actions of harassment then the Act clearly applies and it may be difficult 
for the defendant to rely on the defence of reasonableness. For example, in DPP v 
Moseley, Selvanayagam and Woodling36 it was held that the provision could be 
applied in the context of demonstrations. In this case, one of the defendants had been 
served with a temporary injunction under s.3 of the Act and had continued to 
demonstrate against the fur trade at a fur farm. The defendants were charged with an 
offence under s.2 of the Act and sought to argue that their conduct was reasonable in 
all the circumstances. Although this plea was accepted at ﬁrst instance, the High 
Court held that the defendant who was subject to the original order was precluded 
from relying on the defence as she had clearly broken the term of the original 
injunction. 37 
 
Further, in cases not involving press freedom or a strong public interest in free speech, 
the courts are unlikely to side with free speech, particularly once they are satisfied 
that there is a strong prima facie claim for harassment. This is evident in Hewson, 
where the free speech arguments are based on nothing more than a desire to continue 
a personal feud, which on the facts has gone too far and descended into abuse and 
harassment. In these cases, there is little if any public interest to justify the expression 
                                                 
36 The Times, 23 June 1999. 
37 Similarly, in Silverton and Others v Gravett and Others, unreported, decision of the Queen’s Bench 
Division 19 October 2001, the High Court stressed that the rights under  articles 10 and 11 were not 
absolute and could be restricted by the domestic law to prevent disorder or crime or to protect the 
reputation and rights of others.  
in terms of article 10 and the defendants will not be able to rely on the leeway granted 
to robust and strong speech used in the context of public interest debate. Thus, in 
Brand v Berki 38 it was held that the balance of convenience favoured the continuation 
of an anti-harassment injunction granted to a well-known couple to prevent a 
professional masseuse from continuing a concerted email campaign, numerous 
Twitter posts and internet publicity alleging that the couple had committed serious 
criminal offences. In the court’s view, the conduct amounted to harassment within the 
1997 Act, the masseuse had known that her conduct would cause the couple alarm 
and distress, and there were no defences available to her.39 
 
In addition, it should not be forgotten that the proceedings in Hewson were not of a 
criminal or civil nature, involving as they did a mere warning to the claimant of her 
past and future behaviour. Thus, in the present proceedings, as there had not been 
either a criminal charge or formal civil proceedings issued under the Act, the court 
was not asked to make a definitive ruling on the balance between the right to free 
speech and the victim’s right of protection under the Act; rather the issue was whether 
the PHL, which had followed investigations into the allegations, had been made 
lawfully. That is not to say that articles 8 and 10 had not been engaged, and it is still 
                                                 
38 [2014] EWHC 2979 (QB) 
39 See also AXB v BXA [2018] EWHC 588 (QB), where injunctions restraining an individual from 
harassing a married man and disclosing private information about their affair were made where she 
presented a continuing risk of embarrassment and distress to him and his family. There was a 
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding information about sexual activity, and although that 
expectation could be outweighed based on other considerations, the mere fact that someone wished to 
publish an account of their own life did not provide a sufficient entitlement where to do so would 
engage ECHR article 8 rights of another person who had not given consent. 
important to assess the extent to which free speech arguments will fare in proceedings 
under the 1997 Act, and the compatibility with article 10 of such cases. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In terms of measuring the weight given to freedom of expression in cases brought 
under the Prevention of Harassment Act 1977, the case of Hewson offers little for 
reflection. The free speech strengths of the claimant’s claim were very low and the 
court gave little consideration to the balance of free expression versus the rights of the 
complainant. This was primarily because the claimant had neither been formally 
charged nor had civil proceedings brought against her and thus the court did not have 
the task of balancing free speech with the complainant’s interests and protection from 
harassment.   
 
However, by examining previous case law we have been able to conclude that the 
article 10 rights of people who have allegedly committed acts of harassment under the 
1997 Act will be robustly safeguarded provided there is some discernible public 
interest in that speech. Whether such protection will be as favourable as that on offer 
in cases involving privacy claims is however questionable, as in the latter cases a 
finding of legitimate expectation simply begs the question whether there is an 
overriding public interest in publication; whereas a finding of harassment indicates 
that the conduct and speech has gone beyond the acceptable. Further, when that 
speech has little public interest merit - in other words does not beyond the public’s 
curiosity in being informed of a private dispute -  it is likely that the court’s finding 
that the defendant’s conduct amounts to harassment will be followed by its rejection 
of the reasonableness defence under s.1(3). This is true of cases brought under other 
offences, where an initial finding that the offence has been committed is likely to lead 
to the rejection of any free speech defence.40 
 
Arguably, had the parties involved in our case been warring politicians rather than 
feuding barristers, the court may have given the claimant greater discretion in 
expressing her views about the complainant than they did.41  However, whether the 
parties are politicians are not, it appears that the greater the public interest of the 
speech, the greater chance it has of being protected, even in harassment claims. In this 
respect once the speech loses its value as a matter of public debate, perhaps because it 
has been overtaken by private motive or become mere vulgar abuse, then that speech 
is unlikely to be protected.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
40 For example in cases brought under ss.4 and 5 of the Public Order Act 1986: see DPP  v Clark 
[1992] Crim LR 60 and Norwood v DPP [2003] EWHC 1564 (Admin). 
41 See for example Oberschlik v Austria (1995) 19 EHHR 389, where a politician was referred to as a 
Trottel – a fool. See also Livingstone v Adjudication Panel for England, The Times, November 9 2006, 
where abusive speech was given some protection; contrast Sanders v Kingston [2005 EWHC 1145. 
  
 
 
 
